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Abstract: Farmland preservation programs compensate landowners who enroll for the value lost 
due to the the restrictions on development applied to their land.  These restrictions in principle 
decrease the value of the land.  Yet few studies have found strong statistical evidence that 
preserved parcels sell for lower prices than unpreserved parcels. We use both a hedonic and a 
propensity score method to find that preserved parcels sell for 11.4 to 19.8% less than identical 
unpreserved parcels in Maryland. While significant, a decrease of less than 20% in land value is 
surprisingly small.  If impacts to land value are small, could programs pay landowners less to 
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Introduction 
  Beginning in the mid-1950s, many states, particularly in the Northeast, created 
farmland preservation programs due to concerns about the loss of farmland.  Farmland 
preservation programs are justified on a variety of grounds: to preserve a productive land 
base for the agricultural economy, to preserve the amenity values of open space and rural 
character, to slow suburban sprawl, to provide wildlife habitat, and to provide 
groundwater recharge in areas where suburban development is occurring (Gardner 1977; 
Wolfram 1981; Fischel 1985; McConnell 1989; Bromley and Hodge 1990; Nelson 1992; 
Kline and Wichelns 1998; Hellerstein et al. 2003; Duke and Aull-Hyde 2002).  Since the 
late 1970’s, state and local programs have taken two basic forms, either purchase of 
development rights/purchase of agricultural conservation easements (PDR/PACE), or 
transfer of development rights (TDR).  Most programs attach an easement to the 
preserved land that restricts the right to convert the land to residential, commercial and 
industrial uses.  The landowner is provided with some type of payment and/or tax benefit 
for participation.  
  More than 124 governmental entities in the United States have implemented 
farmland preservation programs and over 1.67 million acres are now in preserved status 
at a cost of almost $4 billion (American Farmland Trust 2005a, 2005b).  Citizens 
continue to pass ballot initiatives generating funds for these types of programs: in 2002, 
$5.7 billion in conservation funding was authorized; in 2001, $1.7 billion; and in 2000, 
$7.5 billion, and most recently in 2006, $5.73 billion (Land Trust Alliance 2006).  In 
addition, the Land Trust Alliance reports that U.S. land trusts have doubled their 
conservation acres from 6 million to 11.9 million acres since 2000.  The state of   3
Maryland, the focus of the research in this paper, has had a variety of state and county 
agricultural land preservation programs since the late 1970’s, with almost 250,000 acres 
preserved by 2004 in the state Maryland Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation 
(MALPF) program.   
  There is a growing body of research evaluating farmland preservation programs.  
Research has asked a broad range of questions related to the programs such as: are 
enough acres enrolled; what types of farms are enrolled – hobby or productive; does 
contiguity matter and is it achieved; do certain programs work better than others (PDR 
versus TDR); do programs impact farmland loss or development patterns; do preserved 
lands provide the amenity benefits people desire; and do the programs have spill-over 
impacts (Conrad and LeBlanc, 1979; Brabec and Smith 2002; Lynch and Lovell 2003; 
Duke and Ilvento 2004; Liu and Lynch 2006; Sokolow 2006, Lynch and Carpenter 2003,  
Duncan 1984; Pfeffer and Lapping 1994; Bergstrom and Ready 2006, Feather and 
Barnard, McConnell and Walls 2005; McConnell, Kopits, and Walls 2006, Bastian et al. 
2002; Lapping 1982; Zollinger and Krannich 2001; Rilla and Sokolow 2000; Nelson 
1992; Feitshans 2003).  Daniels and Lapping (2005) suggest that preservation programs 
should be included in smart growth programs as the two types of objectives complement 
one another.  In Maryland’s recent Smart Growth legislation, the Rural Legacy program 
set out to prioritize preserving contiguous farms to make orderly and fiscally responsible 
development more achievable and create large agricultural zones (Lynch and Liu 2007).  
These papers provide some sense of how agricultural land preservation programs may be 
altered and/or formulated to improve social welfare.   
  Yet these papers and others continue to suggest that too much farmland is being   4
lost
1 in part because PDR programs can be very expensive (MALPF Task Force 2001; 
Gardner 1994; Blewett and Lane 1988; Heimlich and Anderson 2001; Levy and Melliar-
Smith 2003).  To further complicate matters, several papers have now found that 
preservation efforts can generate positive amenities for adjacent homeowners and may 
increase demand for housing near preserved parcels, which makes achieving the goals of 
preservation even more costly and thus more difficult (Geoghegan, Lynch, and Bucholtz 
2003; Ready and Abdalla 2005; Irwin 2002; Roe, Irwin, and Morrow-Jones 2004).  
One of the underlying motivations for farmland preservation programs is that the 
programs keep agricultural land affordable, as farms with conservation easements 
attached should sell at a discount.  The lower-priced land should be more easily 
purchased by new and expanding farmers and thus help retain a viable agricultural sector 
(Gale, 1983).  Therefore in order to evaluate whether farmland preservation programs are 
facilitating the purchase of land for agricultural producers, an analysis of how much the 
easement restriction decrease the selling prices for preserved farms, compared to similar 
properties without easements, is required. 
Another related policy question is what the optimal budget for a farmland 
preservation program should be?  A recent Maryland report suggests that to achieve 
current preservation goal (686,000 more acres), the state would need to allocate as much 
as $4.58 billion to obtain the least expensive eligible acres (Lynch, Palm, Lovell and 
Harvard 2007).  Both of these questions, how much of a discount do farms sell at, and 
what should the program’s budget be, requires a better understanding of the “right” price 
farmers should be paid for their enrollment in the program.  Conceptually, this is quite 
                                                 
1 No real analysis of what is the “optimal” amount of farmland to retain is provided.  Some authors propose 
that too much farmland preservation may be occurring (McConnell 1989)   5
straightforward: the attachment of the easement reduces the value of the agricultural 
property because of the lost opportunity to develop.  If the development rights have no 
value, then no compensation should be paid.  If the development rights are the full market 
value of the land, then a fee simple purchase by the public sector might be most 
appropriate.   
Another alternative view of this issue is to ask if these programs are over-paying 
for the properties they enroll.  For example, if agricultural lands that are enrolled are not 
selling at a discount, does the preservation program provide any benefit to retaining the 
agricultural industry, as they are not making land “more affordable” to farmers?  Or are 
these programs simply providing privately–owned inaccessible open space at a large cost 
to the taxpayers?  In this paper, we try to answer these questions. 
Capital Asset Price theory predicts that the restrictions imposed on further 
development with agricultural easements will reduce the sales price of a farm and thus 
farmland owners should be compensated.  Therefore, it was surprising when Nickerson 
and Lynch, using sales data for 223 farms (20 with easements) in Maryland during 1994-
1997, found little evidence that easement restrictions affect sales price.  Lynch, Gray and 
Geoghegan (2007) reexamined the impact of agricultural easements on sales prices using 
a substantially expanded data set of 3,554 observations in 22 Maryland counties, 
including 249 preserved properties over 1997-2003, using both hedonic pricing models 
and propensity score models.  Results from the hedonic analysis suggest statistically 
significant reductions in price due to preservation, ranging from 11.4% to 16.9%.  
However, the results of a propensity score approach were quite different, taking 
advantage of a very strong predictor of program participation: the distance to the closest   6
preserved parcel.  With this distance variable in the model, the estimated impact of 
preservation on price became small and statistically insignificant.  This means that 
unrestricted land located near preserved parcels tends to sell for the same low price as the 
preserved land.  Anderson and Weinhold (2005) also find a statistically insignificant 
impact on the land value from the easement restrictions.  They find a significant result 
only when they eliminate several control variables from the analysis.  They estimate an 
impact of 35% up to 50% for vacant land with a high variance.  The 50% reduction is 
based on 8 of the 19 easement parcels’ sales with the most strigent easement restrictions.  
A recent study in Baltimore county also finds that preserved parcels do not sell for a 
lower price than unpreserved parcels, all else equal (Michaels 2007).  
We found these results to be quite puzzling.  If these results are true, then the 
agricultural preservation programs are paying much more than the opportunity costs of 
the landowners.  In this current paper, we re-investigate the question once again, using a 
new measure to capture the influence of near-by preserved parcels, i.e. trying to further 
incorporate the spatial aspects of preservation and land markets.  Instead of the distance 
to the nearest preserved parcel, we use GIS techniques to calculate the percent of 
preserved agricultural land in a 1 kilometer and a 5 kilometer buffer surrounding each 
agricultural sales parcel.  We then analyze the impact of agricultural easements on sales 
prices, using both hedonic regression and propensity score approaches, including this 
new variable.  We also investigate a sample that contains only agricultural parcels 
without structures, as these parcels are strictly for agricultural use, to eliminate the 
potentially confounding effect of residential services associated with structures.    7
Maryland Background 
Maryland has been a leader among states in land preservation efforts, with several 
programs to retain land in forest and agricultural use.  These programs began in part 
because the state lost almost 50 percent of its agricultural land, 1.9 million acres, between 
1949 and 1997 (USDA 1999), while its population increased by almost 120% (U.S. 
Census Bureau 1999).  While the losses have been large, Maryland still contains a fair 
amount of natural and working lands on its 6.2 million acres.  In December 2002, 
developed lands represented only 20 percent of Maryland’s total land area, and protected 
lands
2 accounted for another 19 percent.  Much of the remaining 3.8 million acres was 
privately-owned undeveloped land; one-half in agriculture and the other one-half in forest 
or other natural cover.  Maryland recently set a goal of tripling the amount of land 
currently in preservation status to over 1 million acres by the year 2022.   
In the 25 years that agricultural and other preservation programs have existed in 
Maryland, the state and county programs have preserved approximately 343,000 acres.  If 
the programs have managed to purchase easements on the “easiest to enroll” parcels or 
those with the lowest cost, preserving twice this much land in just 20 years will require 
very efficient programs.  Maryland’s population is also projected to grow 11.5% to six 
million people by 2020, likely requiring on-going conversion of agricultural and forest 
land to housing and commercial development.  In addition, preservation is becoming 
more costly as the value of land continues to increase: between 2002 and 2006, average 
land values doubled in Maryland to $8,900 per acre. 
                                                 
2 Protected lands include lands publicly owned at the federal, state, and local levels, as well as private 
preserves and privately owned lands with conservation easements.   8
Maryland began one of the first statewide purchase of development rights (PDR) 
programs in the late 1970's with the creation of the Maryland Agricultural Land 
Preservation Foundation (MALPF).  As of 2004, MALPF has preserved almost 233,000 
acres at a cost of $329 million (MALPF Task Force, 2005); approximately 4% of the 
state land area and 10% of the agricultural acres in the state.  MALPF uses appraisals and 
an “auction” to set the easement value.  It uses the lower of 1) a calculated easement 
value equal to an appraisal value minus the agricultural value, or 2) a bid made by the 
landowner.  Farms are accepted in order of highest value per dollar bid until the budget is 
expended.  MALPF has determined that the savings due to landowners being willing to 
take a lower value than the calculated easement value has been almost $102 million out 
of the total easement value of $398.9 million for the 217,460 acres it had preserved 
through 2002.  This computes to about a 25% discount in the easement values.  Minimum 
eligibility criteria were recently changed to include 50 contiguous acres or contiguity to 
another preserved farm, and having at least 50 percent of its soil classified as USDA 
Class I, II, or III, or Woodland group I or II.   
In addition to the statewide efforts, individual counties have introduced their own 
agricultural preservation programs using both transfer of development rights (TDR) and 
PDR formats.  Calvert County and Montgomery County are considered leaders in the use 
of TDR programs.  Howard County’s use of installment purchase agreements is studied 
throughout the country.  The Rural Legacy program, begun in 1997, as part of the state’s 
Smart Growth program, seeks to preserve large contiguous blocks of natural and working 
landscapes. State-wide, the Rural Legacy program has encumbered $156 million through 
2006 and preserved almost 52,000 acres.  In addition, federal and state tax benefits   9
provide incentives to landowners to enroll their property in preservation programs and 
with the Maryland Environmental Trust (MET). 
MALPF and some of the local preservation programs are funded at least in part by 
the continued conversion of farmland to other uses.  An agricultural transfer tax is 
collected when farmland leaves an agricultural use for a residential, commercial, or 
industrial use.  Through simple calculations, one can determine the cost of preserving one 
acre of land at the average 2002 MALPF easement price per county when the agricultural 
transfer tax is the sole funding mechanism.  Carroll County would require the conversion 
of $60,051 worth of farmland, Baltimore County the conversion of $76,352, St. Mary’s 
the conversion of $49,607, and Talbot County the conversion of $40,722.  In terms of 
acres, the preservation of just one acre of land in Carroll County would require the loss of 
11.65 acres elsewhere in the county, in Baltimore County the loss of 9.6 acres, in St. 
Mary’s the loss of 12.75 acres and in Talbot County the loss of 9 acres (Lynch, Palm, 
Lovell and Harvard 2007). 
Theoretical Framework 
  In a competitive land market, land is assumed to yield a stream of net returns.  
Ricardian theory states that the profitability of agricultural land is based on fertility or 
soil characteristics and this fertility determines the land rent an agricultural producer 
would pay.  Von Thunen, Mills and others proposed that the stream of benefits of 
living/farming at a particular location relative to the town center determines the rent an 
individual would be willing to pay.  Hardie et al. (2001) combine the Ricardian and Von 
Thunen models and find that the market values of parcels in suburban counties are the 
sum of the Ricardian rent and the location or accessibility rent.  Capozza and Helsley   10
(1989) and later Plantinga and Miller (2001) and Plantinga, Lubowski, and Stavins 
(2002) add an expectation component (possible capital gains) when valuing land at the 
urban fringe.  This expected stream of rents and potential gains determines the market 
price per acre Pi of the parcel i.  The market value is thus the expected sum of agricultural 
rents, Ai, from time t=0 up to an optimal conversion date t*, at which time the land is 
converted into a residential use with expected net returns of Ri as shown in equation (1).
3   
Agricultural and residential rents are a function of Xi, the characteristics and 
location of the land, and s, time.   
(1)
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Land ownership may be thought of as a bundle of rights, one of which is the right to 
develop the land up to the allowable zoning density, which a landowner can sell without 
relinquishing ownership of the land.  An agricultural land owner can extract the value of 
these development rights by selling the rights to a preservation program, receive a net 
easement payment, EVi, and the new market price would be the expect sum of 

















i i t i ds e s X A E P  
Land owners will enroll their parcel in an agricultural preservation program if 
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3 To simplify the model only two land uses are used.  However, in some cases the landowner will maximize 
present value by shifting the land use to commercial, industrial or other alternative land uses.   11
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4 
However, whether or not the restrictions are fully capitalized into the land value is an 
empirical question.  In a Washington state PDR program, Blakely (1991) found that 
while the permanent easement restrictions did lower the prices of preserved farms relative 
to unpreserved farms, the resulting prices were much higher than the use value 
assessments based on the stream of agricultural rents.  Nickerson and Lynch (2001) found 
lower prices for restricted prices but found only weak statistical evidence that the 
easement restrictions were the explanation.  Lynch, Gray and Geoghegan (2007) found 
limited evidence of price impacts using propensity score methods.  Anderson and 
Weinhold (2005) and Michaels (2007) also find very limited evidence of significant 
effects on land price. 
Methodology 
The hedonic model is the traditional approach for estimating a capitalization 
effect, and we begin our analysis using this approach.  Hedonic modeling has a long 
tradition in agricultural economics and has been used in innumerable applications.  
Unfortunately, simply including a dummy variable for the existence of an agricultural 
easement in the regression is problematic, since landowners may have (not) entered 
farmland preservation programs specifically because their parcel’s market value was 
lower (higher) than other parcels.  Nickerson and Lynch (2001) use a Heckman model to 
control for sample selection as do Anderson and Weinhold (2005), but neither find a 
significant selection effect.   
                                                 
4 Lynch and Lovell (2003) argue that participation is actually based on the utility of the farmland owner 
under the preserved and non-preserved states and thus may include non-market values beyond those 
mentioned here.   12
In addition to a hedonic model, we also use a non-parametric approach, the 
propensity score method.  This method has multiple benefits.  First, the matching 
protocol ensures that the preserved parcels will be matched to those non-preserved 
parcels that are most similar in terms of characteristics, so dissimilar parcels and outliers 
will have no or little influence in the analysis.  Second, it does not assume that 
preservation status is exogenous, i.e. the decision to participate could depend on the 
parcel’s expected sale price and the expected PDR payment.  Finally, unlike the 
Heckman model, this approach does not assume a specific functional form for the price 
equation. 
The propensity score matching method was developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983).  This method has been used in economic studies to evaluate the effect of job 
training programs (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1997; Dehejia and Wahba 1999; 2002; 
Smith and Todd 2004); labor market effects of college quality (Black and Smith 2004); 
the labor market effects of migration (Ham, Li, and Reagan 2003); the plant birth effects 
of environmental regulations (List, Millimet, Fedriksson, and McHone 2003); and the 
land market effects of zoning (McMillen and McDonald 2002); the impact of 
preservation program on farmland loss (Liu and Lynch 2006); in addition to our earlier 
work on agricultural easements (Lynch, Gray and Geoghegan 2007). 
Assessing the impacts of the easement restrictions is difficult because of 
incomplete information.  While one can identify whether a parcel is preserved (is treated) 
or not (not treated or control) and the outcome (market price) conditional on its treatment, 
one can not observe the counterfactual, i.e. what would have happened if the parcel had 
not been enrolled in a farmland preservation program.  Thus, the fundamental problem in   13
identifying the treatment effect is constructing the unobservable counterfactuals for the 
treated observations.  
Let  1 Y  denote the outcome in the group of observations if treatment has occurred 
( 1 = D ), and  0 Y  denote the outcome for the group of control observations ( 0 = D ).  If one 
could observe the treated and the control states, the average treatment effect, τ, would 
equal  0 1 Y Y − where  1 Y  equals the mean outcome of the treatment group and  0 Y  of the 
control group.  Unfortunately, only  1 Y  or 0 Y  are observed for each observation. In a 
laboratory experiment, researchers solve this problem by randomly assigning subjects to 
be treated or not treated and then construct the counterfactual.  Outside of the laboratory, 
however, 0 1 Y Y − ≠ τ  unless the treatment condition was random assigned.  The propensity 
score matching (PSM) method proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrates 
that if the data justify matching on some observable vector of covariates, X, then 
matching pairs on the estimated probability of selection into treatment or control groups 
based on X is also justified.  We assume a CIA condition that: 
(6)         ] | [ ] , 0 | [ ] , 1 | [ 0 0 0 X Y E X D Y E X D Y E = = = = ,   ) 1 , 0 ( ) | 1 ( ∈ = X D P                            
to estimate the average treatment effect.   
The average treatment effect on the treated is thus the expected difference in 
outcome Y between the treated observations and their corresponding counterfactuals 
constructed from the matched controls. 
(7)                   )) ( , 0 | ( ) 1 | ( ) 1 | ( ) 1 | ( 0 1 0 1 X P D Y E D Y E D Y E D Y E
TT = − = = = − = = Δ           
For the weaker condition to hold, the conditioning set of X needs to include all of the 
variables that affect both selection and outcome.  Finding parcels that have identical   14
values for all covariates in X is not possible since the set of X is usually 
multidimensional.  However, Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) demonstrate that if one 
calculates a propensity score such that ) | 1 ( ) ( X D P X P = = , this is equivalent to 
conditioning on P(X).  So, in our example, all factors that may affect the price outcome 
and the existence of an easement on a parcel except the treatment state are included to 
estimate P(X).  By assuming the X’s are equivalent for the matched treatment and control 
observations, we are controlling for the effects of these factors that may impact the 
market price.   
Data  
Our main data source is the GIS-based MDPropertyView 2002 Database (from 
the Maryland Department of Planning), consisting of all arm’s-length agricultural land 
parcels greater than 10 acres that were sold between 1997 and 2003.
5   In order to 
calculate the per-acre land value, we subtracted the assessed value of any improvements 
to the parcel (such as structures) from the market price, then divided by parcel size to get 
PRICE per acre.  We included both parcels with and without homes.  We did however 
drop parcels deemed either unrepresentative of those a preservation policy would target 
or those which appeared to have data errors.  Thus we dropped all parcels that had 
improvement values of more than $1 million and those with residential structures that had 
no improvement value listed.  Parcels with per-acre land value less than $300 were also 
dropped as this was the minimum assessed agricultural use value.  Due to Critical Area 
regulations, which might interact with preservation development restrictions, we dropped 
all observation having waterfront area.  This resulted in 3,359 observations, of which 245 
                                                 
5 Prices were adjusted using the Index of Prices Received by Farmers (USDA) to a base year of 2003 to 
account for any inflation or deflation that may have occurred during this time period.   15
had easement restrictions.  We also dropped observations from Montgomery County as 
we could not determine the exact number of TDR rights individual parcels within 
Montgomery County had sold or retains and thus the level of restrictions on these 
properties. 
The data set creation relies on the ArcView 3.2 and ArcGIS 8.2 Geographic 
Information Systems (GIS) software programs to extract and combine data for 
geographically referenced parcels.  The compiled data set contains one record for each 
parcel in the State of Maryland at least 10 acres in area, with geocoded parcel-level 
attribute data for each parcel.   
The MDPropertyView 2002 Database (MDPVD) includes data updated through 
October 2002 from the state’s Department of Assessments and Taxation.  For each 
parcel, data were collected from MDPVD on the most current transfer date, price paid for 
the entire parcel at last transfer date, how the parcel was conveyed (arms length or non-
arms length), whether it was part of a multi- parcel sale, number of the parcel in acres, 
waterfront area for those counties near the Atlantic Ocean, Chesapeake Bay or major 
tributaries, the assessed value of the land, the assessed value of all improvements, and the 
total assessed value.  The parcels are spatially referenced by the x and y coordinates in 
NAD83 meters Maryland State Plane Coordinate System.  Each parcel is also identified 
by a unique account number that allows parcel-level links between the various 
MdPropertyView 2002 data files and parcel-level data sets created by other state 
agencies.   
A wealth of data characterizing Maryland lands is linked to the MDPVD land 
parcels spatially through GIS techniques.  For example, the Maryland Department of   16
Planning has detailed land use data from satellite and aerial photography taken as 
recently as 2002.  Land uses are categorized into Urban Areas, Agriculture, and Forest.  
Urban Areas includes the sub-categories low-density residential, medium-density 
residential, high-density residential.  Agriculture includes cropland, orchards, vineyards, 
and agricultural buildings and storage (CROP).  PASTURE was treated as a separate 
land-use. Forest (FOREST) includes deciduous, evergreen, and mixed forests as well as 
brush.  ArcView is used to extract the land use data for each buffer parcel as the percent 
of the parcel in each land use category.   
Soil data come from the U.S. Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation 
Service and Maryland Department of State Planning’s 1973 work to classify and map all 
Maryland soils.  Soils are grouped by productivity, erosion potential, permeability, 
stoniness and rockiness, depth to bedrock, depth to water table, slope, stability, and 
susceptibility to flooding.  The authors define these factors as most significant for land 
use planning purposes.  The Natural Soil Groups Technical Report (Maryland 
Department of State Planning, 1973) provides estimated chemical and physical properties 
for each soil group.  Each soil group is classified according to categories for each of 
several soil properties.  We followed the Maryland classification system in defining 
prime soils (PRIME) as agriculturally productive, permeable, having limited erosion 
potential, and having minimal slope (Maryland Department of State Planning 1973). 
GIS techniques were also used to add distance to nearest metropolitan area 
(Washington, D.C., Baltimore) base on Euclidean distance.  These distances were logged 
to allow for nonlinear impacts (LDDC, LDBALT).     17
  Maryland Department of Planning has also developed a generalized zoning map 
based on the individualized zoning within each county.  ArcView was used to extract a 
generalized zoning code for each parcel within the database to create comparability 
between counties.  ZONE1 (most protective), ZONE2 (moderately protective) and 
ZONE3 (less protective) describe the generalized zoning codes for the rural areas of each 
county, while ZONE4 includes all other less-restrictive zoning categories combined 
(residential, commercial, industrial).  ZONE1 is the most restrictive with a density of 1 
dwelling unit for each 20 acres.  ZONE2 is less restrictive with a density of 1 dwelling 
unit for each 10 to 20 acres. ZONE3 is the least restrictive rural and residential zoning, 
with a density of 1 dwelling unit for each 1 and 10 acres.   
Data was obtained on existing agricultural easements from the Maryland 
Agricultural Land Preservation Foundation (MALPF) published in 2004.
6  Additional 
easements and preservation acquisitions made by state, local, and private organizations 
were compiled from several data sets.
7  Maryland Environmental Trust easements also 
are perpetual restrictions on development.  Private conservation groups’ parcels, such as 
land trusts, were only included when easement restrictions could be ensured; otherwise 
these parcels were deleted from the database.  Subsequently, using the full range of 
preserved properties, the amount of easement area surrounding each agricultural sales 
                                                 
6 For Howard, Calvert, Carroll and Montgomery Counties, we also had information on easement acquired 
through the county programs that might not have been included in the state level data.  We thank Virginia 
McConnell, Elizabeth Kopits and Margaret Walls for assistance with updating the Calvert’s TDR database.  
For other counties, we were unable to locate a source of this information.  Therefore if the county had not 
transmitted information on county-level easements to the State, the analysis would not include them.   
7 Parcels with certain types of easements were excluded from the analysis.  For example, parcels with 
easements labeled as “exclusion, inholding, and road” or with easements which did not have identifiable 
boundaries, tax identification numbers, or geocoded centroids were not included.  
   18
parcel at a 1km (EASE1K) and 5km (EASE5K) radius was calculated, using all easement 
lands, not only those that sold during the study period. 
In some cases, multiple parcels were purchased by the same person on the same 
date and the recorded sales price was not separated between parcels.  Instead, the total 
price for the entire transaction was recorded making it necessary to aggregate these 
parcels into one transaction.  These parcels were aggregated to the “farm-level” where 
properties were adjacent, defined as being within ¼ mile of each other, using the edges of 
the circular parcel buffer as the measurement points.  The parcel-level data were 
aggregated to the farm level by weighting each parcel’s characteristics by the number of 
acres in that parcel.  This applied to the size of the parcel in acres, the number of acres in 
easements, the percentage of prime soil, and the percentage of the parcel in various land 
uses.  The farm-level transaction price and the assessed values for land, improvements, 
and total value were obtained by summing over prices and assessed values per parcel in 
that farm.  If more than one parcel was purchased on the same date by the same person, 
but were further than ¼ mile from each other, they were considered separate 
observations.  In this case, we divided the total sale price weighted by the number of 
acres in each parcel bought. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the full sample as well as the subsamples 
of preserved and unpreserved parcels and parcels without structures.  Preserved parcels 
have a lower per-acre land price on average: $3,293 compared to $5,677.  Preserved 
parcels have a greater amount of preserved land in its vicinity: approximately two and a 
half times as much for the smaller 1 kilometer area, and a little less than half again as 
much for the larger 5 kilometer area.  Preserved parcels are (not surprisingly) more likely   19
to qualify for the MALPF program; they are larger, with a higher percent of prime soils 
and cropland, and have a larger portion in crop use.  Only a small fraction of these 
agricultural parcels are located in residential, commercial or industrial zones, although 
this is more common for the non-preserved parcels.  The land price per acre is lower for 
parcels without structures, even after subtracting off the assessed value of the structure 
for those with structures, while most of the other variables are more similar between the 
full sample and the no structure sub-sample. 
Results 
  In order to test our hypothesis concerning the capitalization of easements into 
agricultural sales prices, we develop a suite of econometric specifications.  We perform a 
side-by-side comparison of a traditional hedonic model and a propensity score matching 
approach, using the same set of covariates in each modeling approach.  In our initial 
analysis, the results suggested that agricultural properties without structures were 
potentially a separate market from parcels with structures, so the models are also 
estimated for the sub-sample of parcels without structures.   
  Table 2 presents the results of an OLS hedonic model of parcel prices for the 
entire sample for three different specifications.  Model 2a is a base case that includes no 
variables relating to nearby easements, models 2b and 2c include the fraction of 
preserved lands in 1 km and 5km buffers, respectively, plus an interaction term between 
these variables and the existence of a structure.
8  That is, EASE1K is the effect of 
protected land within 1 kilometer for parcels without structures, and EASE1K + 
                                                 
8 Including this interaction term was necessary in order for the PSM model to pass balancing tests.  The 
hedonic model had qualitatively similar results without the interaction term, but the results presented here 
include the interaction terms to facilitate direct comparisons between the two modeling approaches.     20
EASE1K_S is the effect for parcels with structures (EASE1K_S is the marginal impact of 
EASE1K for parcels with structures). 
Estimated per-acre land prices for preserved parcels in the hedonic models are 
about 11% lower, and this effect is statistically significant across model specification.  
There may be something of a neighborhood effect of preservation although the evidence 
here is weak.  For parcels without structures, increasing the fraction of the buffer land 
enrolled in preservation programs by 10 percentage points would decrease the selling 
price of the parcel by 0.9% for the 1 km buffer and by 2.8% for the 5 km buffer.  For 
parcels with structures, the estimated effect is opposite: for the 1 km buffer, prices would 
increase by 1.5%, while for increases in the 5 km buffer, prices would increase by 0.7%.  
The control variables generally have the expected effects: higher prices per acre 
for properties with prime agricultural soils, higher levels of crop rather than pasture or 
forest and with structures present; lower prices per acre for parcels farther from cities or 
with larger total area.  The zoning variables do not behave completely as expected.  With 
the excluded category of ZONE3 (the least restrictive rural zoning), the estimated 
coefficient on ZONE4 (all other residential and commercial zoning) is positive and 
statistically significant, as expected, and the estimated coefficient on ZONE2 is negative 
and statistically significant (as fewer houses are permitted per acre, i.e. zoning density 
decreases, the market value of the land decreases).  However, the estimated coefficient on 
ZONE1 is counter-intuitively positive and statistically significant.   
The population growth rates in the 1970s and 1980s do not have a statistically 
significant impact on the selling price of agricultural property, but the population growth   21
rate between 1990 and 2000 does have a positive and statistically significant impact on 
the market value, suggesting that only recent population growth affects sales prices. 
Moving from the hedonic approach to the propensity score approach, the first 
stage of the propensity score analysis involves estimating a probit model of the 
propensity for a property to be preserved.  Table 3 present these results.  Similar to the 
hedonic approach, we estimate three different specifications: a base, with EASE1K, with 
EASE5K.   We find a greater probability of easements on properties that are larger, with 
more crop land and prime agricultural soils, and (not surprisingly) properties indicated to 
be eligible for the program.  Structures, distance to cities, and population growth rates 
have no statistically significant impact on the probability of enrollment.  The individual 
easement buffer variables (EASE1K and EASE5K) significantly increase the probability 
of enrollment – the more neighboring land is enrolled, the greater the probability of a 
parcel being enrolled, all else equal.  In addition, the inclusion of the EASE1K or 
EASE5K increases the value of the pseudo-R-squared.  The same (odd) pattern of results 
on the zoning variables from the hedonic models hold for these models as well: relative 
to ZONE3, ZONE4 decreases and ZONE2 increases the probability of enrollment, as 
expected, but ZONE1 unexpectedly decreases the probability of enrollment.   
In Table 4, we find the final results of the propensity score analysis for the full 
sample and the two sub-samples: those parcels with and those without structures. The 
“average effect of treatment on the treated” (ATT) values are calculated as the difference 
between the sales price of each easement property (the treatment group) and the average 
sales price for a comparison (control) group of non-easement properties with similar 
estimated probabilities of participating in a preservation program.  We consider two   22
approaches for forming the control groups: nearest-neighbor (based on the single closest 
control observation to the treatment observation); and kernel (based on a distance-
weighted average of all observations “reasonably close” to the treatment observation).   
For the full sample, using propensity scores calculated for the base model, the 
nearest-neighbor matching method estimates the market price of preserved parcels to be 
6.2 to 9.1%  lower than comparable non-preserved parcels, although the bootstrapped t-
statistics are somewhat weak.  The kernel method substantially increases the estimated 
effect of preservation, with 13.6 to 14.7% lower prices for preserved parcels, while 
allowing nearly all of the non-preserved parcels to serve in one or more of the 
comparison groups.  Including the EASE1K and EASE5K variables, respectively, change 
the coefficients and t-statistics only slightly.  Thus the impact of the easement restrictions 
is robust to the measures of the degree of preservation of lands near the parcel (unlike the 
results of the Lynch, Gray and Geoghegan (2007) paper where the “distance to nearest 
preserved parcel” variable was used.  
The results for the no structure dataset demonstrate a greater estimated effect of 
easements on sales price.  The kernel model approach, with statistically significant 
results, has a range of decreased market land values per acre of 18.2% to 22.6%.  Parcels 
with no structures and with limited ability to build structures in the future are the one we 
would most expect to demonstrate a price decrease due to easement restrictions.   
The results for the structure sub-sample are similar although smaller overall.  The 
kernel model approach, does have statistically significant results unlike the nearest 
neighbor, has a range of decreased market land values per acre of 10.4% to 13.3%.    23
Parcels with no structures and with limited ability to build structures in the future are the 
one we would most expect to demonstrate a price decrease due to easement restrictions.   
Conclusions 
Hedonic models of land price per acre suggest statistically significant reductions 
in price due to preservation, ranging from 11.4% to 16.8% and the propensity score 
matching approach (using the kernel method) shows a similar, and statistically 
significant, range of 13.6% to 19.8%.  We found results differ for the sub-sample that 
only contained parcels without structures – these latter parcels sell at a greater discount, 
suggesting a much different market between parcels with structures (which might be 
purchased as “hobby farms” or due to the amenity value of the open space) and parcels 
without structures (where the land value is more clearly related to agricultural 
production).  Therefore, we do see a price decrease in the parcels that have sold with an 
easement.  
In addition, we find that preserved parcels have a greater amount of preserved 
land in its vicinity: approximately two and a half times as much for the smaller 1 
kilometer area, and a little less than half again as much for the larger 5 kilometer area.  
This suggests that some degree of contiguity is being achieved although the mean values 
are quite small (18% for the preserved area within 1 kilometer and 12% for that within 5 
kilometers).  Preserved parcels are also larger than non-preserved parcels (on average 86 
acres compared to 39 acres).  They also have a higher average quality of soil:  58% prime 
soils rather than 41% for the unpreserved parcels) and higher average cropland per 
parcels: 68% as compared to 49%.  Less than 1 percent of them are located in residential,   24
commercial or industrial zones with over 55% is the two most restrictive zoning areas 
compared to 44% of the unpreserved parcels.   
Surprisingly however, the population growth in the block groups surrounding the 
preserved parcels is very similar to those of the unpreserved parcels, although recent 
population growth was statistically significant in the models explaining sale prices.  
While these variables were included to control for growth pressures, perhaps other 
measures are required to capture this effect, such as population density.  Also somewhat 
surprisingly, preserved parcels are slightly closer to Baltimore MD and/or Washington, 
D.C. than unpreserved parcels.  These attributes of preserved parcels, albeit only the ones 
that have sold since their preservation suggests that the programs are retaining the types 
of farms desired, that they are achieving some degree of continuity, and that they may be 
preserving threatened agricultural parcels.   
However, even though this set of preserved parcels appear to have desirable 
characteristics given the goals of the programs relative to non preserved parcels, the 
impact on land values for the degree of easement restriction is surprisingly small – less 
than 20%.  This suggests that MALPF and other preservation program may be paying too 
much or offering tax benefits that are too large.  Landowners receive payments from 
MALPF for their development value but the market does not appear to decrease their land 
value by a commensurate degree.  For this sample, the predicted decrease in value 
averaged only $660 per acre whereas the average easement payment in 2002 was $2,717 
per acre.  Hypothetically then, a landowner could sell their land after enrolling it in a 
preservation program and make an “extra” $2000 per acre.  Of course, an issue with any 
voluntary program is the need to pay sufficiently to induce participation.  Waiting lists   25
and/or low discounting on some bids suggest that some landowners have realized they 
may be better off enrolling prior to any sale.  Clearly, landowners do not gain this extra 
benefit until they actually sell the land.   
One interpretation of our results is that landowners do not enroll in preservation 
programs in those areas where land values are high (or likely to become high in the near 
future).  We tried to control for this using distance to Baltimore and Washington 
measures as well as population growth rates over the past 30 years, but including these 
variables did not affect our main results.  Because high land values are likely to be linked 
to local development pressures, we may be missing this effect by including the entire 
state of Maryland in a single analysis.  Similarly, the zoning categories may be acting as 
proxies for some county-level attributes other than development density for those 
counties that have very protective zoning.  Therefore, we plan to treat different sub-
regions of Maryland as separate markets and re-estimate these models to test the extent of 
regional differences, as well as to incorporate different measures of growth pressures, 
such as changes in population density, in the model.   
Many people suggest PDR programs are not effective because they cost too much 
money and thus can not enroll enough acres.  Our results suggest they may not be 
efficient in the sense they pay more for the development rights than opportunity costs to 
the landowners of foregoing them.  It is possible that programs may be able to pay less 
and still induce individuals to participate in the programs.  In this manner, the budget will 
stretch further and more acres may be enrolled.    26
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
    Preserved   
  3152 - full sample  Yes  No 
  N=3152    N = 255  N=2897  
 Mean  standard 
dev. 
Mean Mean   
price 5,484  8,732  3,293 5,677 Price($/ acre, adjusted) 
logpr 8.076  0.987  7.820 8.099 Log(Price) 
agprot 0.081 0.273  1.000 0.000 Preserved parcel (0/1) 
ease1k 0.082  0.141 0.181 0.073 Fraction preserved within 1 kilometer 
ease5k 0.074  0.074 0.116 0.070 Fraction  preserved within 5 kilometers 
elig 0.397  0.489  0.773 0.364 Meets  eligibility criteria for MALPF(0/1) 
prime  0.427  0.423  0.583 0.413 Fraction of prime quality soil in parcel 
crop 0.504  0.349  0.678 0.489 Fraction of cropland in parcel 
struct 0.548  0.498  0.620 0.542 Structure present (0/1) 
lacres 3.742  0.911  4.455 3.679 Log(Acres) 
ldbalt  11.136  0.697  11.006 11.148 Log (distance to Baltimore MD) 
lddc  11.368  0.475  11.284 11.376 Log (distance to Washington DC) 
popg78 0.236  0.179  0.245 0.236 Census Tract population growth 70-80 
popg89 0.155  0.129  0.160 0.155 Census Tract population growth 80-90 
popg90 0.109  0.116  0.115 0.108 Census Tract population growth 90-00 
zone1 0.184  0.388  0.106 0.191 Most restrictive rural zoning  
zone2 0.260  0.439  0.447 0.244 Less restrictive zoning 







0.012  0.072  All other zoning (residential, 
commercial, industrial) 
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Table 2: Hedonic Results: Full Sample (N=3,152) 
--------------------------------------------------- 
Model :         2a            2b            2c            
Depvar:      logprice       logprice     logprice           
--------------------------------------------------- 
intcpt        16.377        16.387        16.411        
             (25.64)       (25.66)       (25.59)       
agprot        -0.114        -0.119        -0.113        
             (-2.33)       (-2.40)       (-2.30)       
struct         0.159         0.140         0.133         
              (6.06)        (4.64)        (3.64)        
lacres        -0.401        -0.401        -0.401        
            (-27.20)      (-27.18)      (-27.15)     
prime          0.168         0.169         0.170         
              (4.57)        (4.58)        (4.60)          
ldbalt         -0.40        -0.40         -0.401        
             (-10.65)     (-10.64)      (-10.63)       
lddc          -0.220        -0.220        -0.220        
             (-3.59)       (-3.58)       (-3.59)       
crop           0.272         0.274         0.274         
              (6.92)        (6.94)        (6.95)        
zone1          0.135         0.132         0.137         
              (3.55)        (3.43)        (3.56)        
zone2         -0.245        -0.250        -0.244        
             (-6.76)       (-6.79)       (-6.52)       
zone4          0.172         0.172         0.172         
              (3.25)        (3.24)        (3.23)        
popg78         0.084         0.087         0.087         
              (0.96)        (0.99)        (0.99)        
popg89        -0.166        -0.169        -0.164        
             (-1.37)       (-1.40)       (-1.36)       
popg90         0.635         0.628         0.628        
              (5.21)        (5.15)        (5.15)        
ease1k                      -0.092       
                           (-0.66)     
ease1k_s                     0.238        
                            (1.31)       
ease5k                                    -0.283       
                                         (-0.93)       
ease5k_s                                   0.348         
                                          (0.99)       
R-sq          0.484         0.485         0.484         
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Table 3: Probit Model of Easement Participation: Full Sample (N=3,152) 
------------------------------------------------- 
Model :         3a            3b           3c           
Probability of Being Preserved 
------------------------------------------------- 
intcpt        -3.864        -4.252        -5.421       
             (-2.06)       (-2.16)       (-2.75)      
malpf          0.471         0.519         0.522       
              (3.52)        (3.72)        (3.81)       
struct         0.109         0.089         0.015       
              (1.42)        (0.91)        (0.12)       
lacres         0.290         0.271         0.265       
              (4.00)        (3.62)        (3.58)       
prime          0.327         0.337         0.369       
              (3.08)        (3.04)        (3.36)       
ldbalt         0.026         0.058         0.089       
              (0.23)        (0.49)        (0.74)       
lddc          -0.011        -0.010         0.052       
             (-0.06)       (-0.05)        (0.27)      
crop           0.771         0.746         0.746       
              (6.04)        (5.66)        (5.72)       
zone1         -0.342        -0.471        -0.443       
             (-2.83)       (-3.66)       (-3.50)      
zone2          0.262         0.133         0.108       
              (2.65)        (1.29)        (1.04)       
zone4         -0.706        -0.690        -0.685       
             (-2.58)       (-2.41)       (-2.45)      
popg78         0.327         0.510         0.537       
              (1.25)        (1.84)        (1.93)       
popg89        -0.223        -0.617        -0.457        
             (-0.58)       (-1.45)       (-1.08)       
popg90         0.385         0.254         0.284       
              (1.02)        (0.63)        (0.71)      
ease1k                       1.737        
                            (5.26)       
ease1k_s                     0.403        
                            (0.95)       
ease5k                                     2.926        
                                          (3.43)       
ease5k_s                                   1.098       
                                          (1.13)       
R-sq          0.181         0.224          0.206         
================================================== 
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Table 4: Average Effect of Treatment on the Treated (ATT) Models 
 
                Full-Sample (3,152 obs) 
 
      ATT – nearest neighbor    ATT – kernel 
 
BASE   255 / 218   -0.088    -1.0    255 / 2768    -0.147   -2.7 
 
EASE1K  255 / 206    -0.062   -0.7    255 / 2582   -0.136    -2.7 
 
EASE5K  255 / 207   -0.091    -1.2    255 / 2681   -0.146    -2.5 
 
 
          No-Structure Sub-sample  (1,424 obs) 
 
      ATT – nearest neighbor    ATT – kernel 
 
BASE   97 / 86     -0.149    -1.0    97 / 1243    -0.226   -2.9 
 
EASE1K   97 / 78   -0.149     -1.2     97 / 1139   -0.191    -2.4 
 
EASE5K  97 / 82  -0.152      -1.3     97 / 1205   -0.182    -2.4 
 
 
     
        Structure  Sub-sample  (1,728 obs) 
 
    ATT – nearest neighbor      ATT – kernel 
BASE   158 / 141   +0.016     +0.1    158 / 1416    -0.104   -1.9 
 
EASE1K  158 / 125   +0.001     +0.0    158 / 1319   -0.109    -1.7 
 
EASE5K  158 / 126   +0.067      +0.7    158 / 1338   -0.133    -2.3 
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